Who Pays Repair Downed Power Lines Pse

Inconvenient for all, deadly for some

Californians accept grown unhappily familiar with the term "Public Rubber Power Shutoff." Residents receiving a PSPS warning brace themselves for power outages that could last days – a prospect triggering badgerer in many and serious, justified anxiety in others.

For the millions of Californians now working and schooling from domicile, extended power outages disrupt productivity and create meaning inconvenience. For individuals who depend on electrically powered medical, mobility, or other essential devices, loss of electricity tin be life threatening. Robert Mardis of El Dorado Canton provides a sad example. He died during a 2022 PSPS event when he was not able to accomplish his battery powered backup oxygen system in time.¹ Even with backup batteries, many medical devices will not terminal through a typical PSPS event. This leaves many people scrambling for backup power or a identify to stay with more than reliable electricity.

PSPS are inconvenient for all and deadly for some. So when, where, and how often will they proceed to occur? And what is being washed to brand them less common, shorter, and less crushing?

Why practise PSPS events happen at all?

Utility companies have been delinquent in power organization maintenance that would reduce the chance of sparking fires. U.Due south. District Judge William Alsup, in accuse of PG&Eastward'south criminal probation for utility-caused wildfires in 2022, neatly explained how we arrived at this situation: "Pacific Gas & Electric Visitor, though the unmarried largest privately-owned utility in America, cannot safely deliver power to California. This failure is upon united states of america because for years, in order to enlarge dividends, bonuses, and political contributions, PG&E cheated on maintenance of its filigree — to the signal that the grid became unsafe to operate during our annual high winds, and then unsafe that the grid itself failed and ignited many catastrophic wildfires." ^{2 three}

Utilities are required to ensure clearance between energized power lines and trees or limbs that might hit the lines. When copse or branches hit power lines, either the branch can crusade a curt excursion betwixt two lines, or the branch tin push lines together to crusade a brusk excursion directly between the lines. In either case, the short tin cause the co-operative to catch fire, or cause sparks or molten metallic to drib on and ignite bushes or grass. During dry out and windy atmospheric condition, this tin spark a catastrophe. In 2022, the Vino Country Fires (Atlas, Nuns, and 15 other fires) were caused past such a tree strike and ultimately killed 22 people. The Campsite Fire in 2022 killed 85 people and, again, was caused by PG&E mechanical failures and tree strikes from failure to maintain adequate clearances.⁴

Some other way tree strikes tin occur is when power lines sag into trees. This can happen when lines are overloaded, causing them to overheat, stretch, and expand. The 2003 coma across the U.S. Northeast and Canada was initiated past such a tree strike. It left 50 million people without power for 2 to four days, causing $4-10 billion in economical amercement.⁵ Events like these fires and the Northeast coma are why PSPS accept become mutual practice. To prevent fires, deaths, and large cascading outages, and to compensate for years of bereft maintenance, utilities take instituted smaller, more controlled outages.

What are PSPS other than scheduled power outages?

PSPS events are basically a temporary fix to a failed system. Lack of maintenance increases wildfire risk and years of deferred maintenance can't exist made up for in a month or even a year. In 2022, PG&E CEO Bill Johnson told the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) that maintenance to foreclose wildfires would get better every yr, only information technology would be a ten yr effort to get PSPS events "ratcheted downward significantly ." ⁶

PSPS originated in 2022 when the CPUC ruled that electrical utilities could shut off power to prevent electric equipment from sparking wildfires, particularly during dry, windy weather.^vii SDG&E had originally requested permission from CPUC to bear fire-prevention close-offs in 2008, but the request wasn't granted until 2022.⁸ In 2022, the CPUC extended the PSPS ruling to permit all Investor Owned Utilities (IOUs) in California^ix to have PSPS, along with establishing some requirements for notification and reporting them.¹⁰

From 2022-2020, California utilities reported cutting power to more than 3.2 million customers (not unique customers — sometimes the same customers get close off multiple times during different events). PSPS events have accounted for more than 9 billion customer outage minutes since 2022. ¹¹ This equates to, on average, more than than one hour and xvi minutes per yr for each of the almost 15 1000000 utility customers in California.

While virtually California utility customers take non experienced PSPS events yet, some have faced numerous outages lasting multiple days each year. The average outage fourth dimension of 1+ hours is therefore misleading. For those experiencing PSPS shutoffs, the boilerplate duration is almost 2 days, with some outages extending longer than six days. The duration of a PSPS outage is driven past two factors: (one) the duration of the weather issue triggering the need to de-energize and (2) the amount of time it takes the utility to determine the event is over and audit the lines to ensure they can exist safely re-energized.

How long are PSPS and how often practice they occur?

In Table ane nosotros summarize the history of PSPS events since 2022. The number of events reported, number of circuits de-energized, number of customers impacted, and the duration of outages have all trended college over this menstruum.

Events are reported by utilities when their adventure analysis indicates they need to shut-downwards some circuits to prevent sparking fires. The number of circuits de-energized varies for each outcome, depending on how widespread the weather that is causing the increased risk. Some circuits, especially in densely populated areas, may have thousands of customers. Customers tin be businesses or homes, and commonly include more than i person impacted per customer.

While there has been a significant increase in the number of events and number of customers impacted since 2022, some of this may simply be from assuasive more utilities to accept PSPS events, and capturing more data after the 2022 ruling extended PSPS permission and reporting requirements to all IOUs. While SDG&E began reporting in 2022, PG&E and SCE first reported PSPS in 2022, with SCE'southward first actual close-off occurring in January 2022. PacifiCorp simply started reporting in 2022. As PacificCorp accounts for less than ane% of California customers, this has not had a meaning impact on the overall numbers.

Past 2022, utilities serving 82% of California'southward customers were reporting PSPS events to the CPUC; as such, any deeper assay should start there. Since 2022, the number of events has continued to increase. The number of circuits de-energized and the number of customers impacted has been more than volatile, with a peak in 2022, driven in big part by the memorable events of Oct 2022, when more than two million customers (1.7 meg in PG&E territory) experienced PSPS outages. October 2022's PSPS consequence occurred equally multiple wildfires already raged (Caples in El Dorado, Kincade in Sonoma County, Saddle Ridge, and Tick in Los Angeles) and the preceding hot dry out weather that helped ignite and spread them continued. In addition, atmospheric condition reports predicted winds exceeding fourscore mph.¹² As a upshot, the average and maximum outage durations in 2022 were likewise longer than other years because of the severity and length of the October 2022 events. Given the sheer number of customers impacted, this heavily weights all the statistics.

The boilerplate PSPS outage elapsing across both the 2022-2020 and the 2022-2020 periods was 41 hours (i.seven days). The longest recorded PSPS outage duration reported was 162.8 hours (6.75 days). The October 2022 events account for near half (47%) of the nine billion client outage minutes recorded between 2022-2020 and according to Michael Wara of the Stanford Wood Institute for the Environment, the economic toll of these shut-offs in merely one month of 2022 could approach $2.five billion.^thirteen That indicates that the full cost of reported PSPS outages from 2022-2020 could be $five.three billion, or approximately $0.58 per customer outage minute.

For the years with the 3 largest utilities reporting, we see an boilerplate of 14 PSPS events per year and more than one million customers impacted per year.

Tabular array 1: PSPS Statistics past Year

Year	PSPS Events	Circuits Impacted	Customers Impacted	Boilerplate Outage Duration (Hours)	Maximum Outage Elapsing (Hours)	Utilities Reporting
2013	1	five	183	seven.0	eight.9	SDG&E
2014	3	10	1,367	fifteen.8	32.3	SDG&East
201514	0	0	0	0	0	None
201615	0	0	0	0	0	None
2017	5	66	20,820	36.ane	144.9	SDG&E
2018	7	91	84,565	37.6	93.vii	PG&E, SCE, SDG&Eastward
2019	15	2,290	2,230,459	45.ix	162.8	PG&E, SCE, SDG&Eastward
2020	20	1,168	862,475	32.two	133.eight	PacifiCorp, PG&E, SCE, SDG&E
Total	51	three,630	3,199,869	41.0 16	162.8	PacifiCorp, PG&E, SCE, SDG&E

There are some notable differences in numbers of customers impacted and outage durations between the diverse utilities, as shown in Table 2. The information show that PG&East customers experience more outages (6-eight times more per client than in other utilities) and longer boilerplate outage durations (one.5 times longer) than the other large utilities (SDG&E and SCE). PG&E's impacted client counts dwarf the other utilities' counts, such that reporting from SDG&E earlier 2022 doesn't even testify up at the scale needed for PG&East unless nosotros use a logarithmic scale, as is shown in the lower one-half of Figure 1. We apply a logarithmic scale when the information range is large; rather than having each increment increase by an equal amount (say by 10 outage hours as in the upper graph), each increment is ten times larger than the last, equally is used in the lower graph (1,10,100, 1,000 Customers Impacted). Once again, this is only three years of data with statistics driven by Oct 2022; while PG&E has had the largest number of customers impacted and the longest outage at 6.8 days, SDG&E has also had an outage lasting longer than six days. While PG&E has the worst record, the PSPS problem goes across PG&E.

Some of the utilities take done more nigh the issue. SDG&E has invested significantly to put transmission and distribution lines clandestine to protect them from wind and tree strikes.¹⁷ Undergrounding and other additional wildfire prevention and mitigation measures are the biggest drivers for costs in SDG&E being 50%-100% higher per kWh than other utilities.^xviii The investment may be paying off, as SDG&Due east'southward PSPS durations have been on a down trend since their peak at 46 hours in 2022 to an average duration in 2022 of less than one-half a day (run into Figure i, and subsequent analysis on "Outage Elapsing" below).

Table 2: Utility Comparisons

Utility	# Customers Served (Thousands) 19	% Cust. Served (% of all CA Customers)	# Cust. w/ PSPS Outages 2013-2020 (Thousands) 20	% Cust. west/ PSPS Outages 2013-2020 21	Average PSPS Duration (Hours)
PacifiCorp	47	0.003	two.six	0.06	vii.seven
PG&E	5,590	0.38	2,701	0.48	46.8
SCE	5,150	0.35	391	0.08	26.half dozen
SDG&Due east	1,480	0.10	106	0.07	30.ii
Others	ii,490	0.17	0	0	0.0
Total	14,757	100	3,201	22	41.0

Figure 1: Boilerplate outage duration and total customers impacted by year and utility

Where are PSPS events happening?

PG&Due east territory suffers more outages, as shown in Figure 2, but that's also in part because PG&Due east has a bigger PSPS challenge than the other utilities — it covers more area total, and also covers more area in Tier ii and Tier 3 High Fire-Threat Commune (HFTD) zones.

Figure 2: Tier ii ("Elevated" in xanthous) and Tier 3 ("Extreme" in ruby) High Fire-Threat District (HFTD) zones.²⁰ PG&E – Orange border; SDG&E – Cerise edge; SCE – Green.

PSPS events are typically centered in Tier 2 and Tier 3 High Burn-Threat District (HFTD) zones, simply many include neighboring regions, and in some cases include regions completely outside of Tier ii and Tier 3. An interactive map of HFTD zones is bachelor at https://ia.cpuc.ca.gov/firemap/ ²³   for those interested in exploring in more than detail.

Utility reporting to date identifies how many customers are impacted by de-energizing sure equipment, and whether those customers are in Tier 2, Tier 3, and/or exterior of an HFTD tier. As service areas are not the same as tier boundaries, many times the identification of HFTD tier is "Tier two, Tier iii and Outside," making assay of PSPS impacts and HFTD zones interaction somewhat challenging. As you lot can see in Figure 3, only about 5% of PSPS outages occur completely outside of HFTD tiers. Merely over a quarter (27%) occur only in PSPS Tiers, with most of that (19%) impacting both Tier 2 and Tier three simultaneously. Given that Tier 2 surrounds Tier 3, it is not surprising that only 2% of outages include Tier 3 and areas outside of Tier 3 only non Tier 2. The vast majority of PSPS outages touch on Tier ii, Tier iii and areas Outside of HFTD tiers — 68% of them.

Bottom line, living or working in or near an HFTD zone is a good indicator that PSPS outages will bear upon you or your business organization, and as Figure 3 shows, most of California and about all major population centers are in or nearly an HFTD zone.

Effigy three: Distribution of outages across HFDT Tiers (Thousands of Customers, percent of full)

What happens next?

Frequency of events

While utilities try to catch up on maintenance, weather and climate forecasts that bear on PSPS events are likely to go more common and more severe.²⁴ A recent U.Southward. EPA report explains that: "Wildfires, a longstanding and frequent threat to California, are expected to increase in intensity and frequency due to climatic change," and "fire flavor now starts before, and ends later."²⁵

Because burn run a risk drives PSPS events, their overall frequency and the geographic area they affect are likely to increase. Four meteorological variables affect the length and severity of fire flavor:

1. maximum temperatures,
2. minimum relative humidity,
3. the number of pelting-gratis days, and
4. maximum wind speeds.²⁶

Figure four shows California's annual maximum temperature (tiptop graph) has risen by ii degrees Fahrenheit in the last century and continues to rise. Higher maximum temperatures volition go along to generate more burn risks and likely trigger more PSPS events. However, climate change isn't merely about hotter temperatures.

Humidity and rain-free days both correlate with drought and the Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI) in the lower graph of Figure iv estimates relative soil moisture weather condition over the last century. PDSI of less than 0 indicate dryer than normal conditions. The trend toward more drought years (more than yellow bars) and more severe drought conditions (longer yellowish confined) is articulate. Besides, don't let the cartoonish nature of Figure five mislead y'all — information technology is a powerful representation of increasing drought severity in California from 2000-2014. Figure half dozen, which is the focus of the adjacent department, also shows a downward tendency in relative humidity consistent with PDSI. Thus, both meteorological variables two and three are trending toward more fires and PSPS events.

Figure iv: California Maximum Temperature and Palmer Drought Severity Index 1900-2020 ^{27 28}

Figure v: Using California as the vertical centrality, Randall Munroe of webcomic xkcd.com compiled drought data from the U.s.a. Drought Monitor to plot drought levels over fourth dimension in CA ²⁹

The concluding, but not least important meteorological variable is wind. The strength and duration of high air current events straight impacts the frequency and duration of PSPS events. California's most destructive wildfires have been linked to the occurrences of Diablo Winds (DWs), and information from four Remote Access Weather Stations (RAWS) and two other wind information sources³⁰ shown in Figure six demonstrate obvious trends since 1980: an increasing number of Diablo Wind events over time, increasing wind speeds, and an increasing number of hours per yr with Diablo Winds. ³¹

Figure half dozen: Time serial of the a) total number of DWs per twelvemonth (September–December), b) total hours/durations of DWs per year, c) the associated maximum wind speeds (m s−i), and d) the associated minimum relative humidity (%) from NARR (red lines), ERA5 (blueish lines), and RAWS (black lines) ³²

Expansion of fire and PSPS seasons

Most PSPS impacts have occurred belatedly summer through early wintertime, with a peak in October (Effigy 7). Research on climate-induced variation in fire seasons worldwide between 1979 and 2022 shows that "fire weather season length and long fire weather season afflicted surface area increased significantly beyond all continents except Australia."³³ In the years after this written report, Australia has joined the tendency, experiencing more than dangerous burn atmospheric condition, including its hottest twelvemonth on record (2019), an increased frequency of fires, an earlier showtime to burn season, and in 2022 and 2022, two of the worst fire seasons ever recorded.⁴² Every bit fire season expands in California, nosotros can expect more than fires and more PSPS events across more than months of the year.

Figure eight: Reported events by month of incident, 2022-2020

Outage durations

How long practise and volition PSPS events last? Historically, PSPS events last on average just nether ii days, with a maximum duration observed so far of just under a calendar week, but with some differences beyond years and utilities. For those who want to go along with a bit of a deep dive into statistics, continue on; for those who desire to avoid stats, jump ahead to "Location of events."

Figure 9 presents a somewhat more consummate, and thus more complicated, view of PSPS outage durations. Each utility has its own colour, with the trace condign darker in more contempo years. The grey series shows the average Cumulative Distribution Role (CDF) per year, weighted by number of customers impacted in that year for each utility. Finally, the boilerplate across all utilities and years is shown in the darkest grey trace.

First, for non-statisticians who still chose this path, a Cumulative Distribution Function describes the probability that a variable (Outage Durations, in this case) volition have values less than or equal to the X axis value. For a very simple example, meet PacifiCorp in 2022 (in orange). PacifiCorp reported ane incident in 2022, with all outages lasting more than than 6 hours and less than 8 hours. The CDF for PacifiCorp in 2022 equals zero until the sixth hour, ramps quickly upwardly to 1 by hour 8. For PG&East in 2022 (the furthest right correct, in red), we can see that half of the outages lasted longer than 48 hours (where the line crosses the 0.5 on the Y-centrality) and that more than 10% of outages lasted longer than 94 hours (where the line crosses the 0.9 on the Y-centrality). When the CDF trace is flat for extended periods, that indicates long periods when no power was restored, as can exist seen in PG&East'southward 2022 data betwixt hours 26 and 38. Similarly, steep sections of the CDF indicate many customers existence re-energized, either with many circuits getting turned back on, or large circuits impacting many customers. PG&Eastward's 2022 data between hours forty and 46 is a skillful example of this, equally almost 40% of the outages were restored in this 6-hour menstruum.

Scanning all years and utilities, the median outage durations (0.5 on the Y-axis) range from 6 hours to most 2 days, with the overall median hitting at 42-44 hours.

Focusing on SDG&E (select "SDG&Eastward" in the story line) for a moment, we see that 2022 had brusque outages, akin to PacifiCorp, merely 2022 had longer outages, much similar PG&Due east's 2022. Every bit was shown in Figure 1, SDGE's boilerplate outage was less than half a day in 2022, grew to almost iii days in 2022, and and then returned to less than half a twenty-four hours by 2022.

PG&E's all-time reported year was 2022(now select "PG&East" in the story line) , with all customers restored within 2 days; their worst yr was 2022, when some customers were without power for almost a week, and half its customers were out for at least ii days. PG&E's 2022 data falls correct dorsum betwixt 2022 and 2022.

SCE reported outages in 2022 and 2022, with boilerplate duration in both years beingness relatively consistent. Notation though, that in 2022 you can see that virtually 8 percent of customers had longer outages than whatsoever SCE customer outages in 2022, with 3 percent of customers not being re-energized for more than 4 days.

Finally, averaging across all utilities and years provides the best judge for time to come events (select "All Years Average"). Given the small sample size, and without diving into detailed local assay for utility companies, specific circuits, air current regimes, drought predictions, etc., information technology would be unwise to predict SDG&Eastward or SCE volition continue to have shorter outages. In all likelihood, some years will exist worse in Southern California, some volition be worse in the Sierras, and PG&East volition go along to have the well-nigh customers impacted. With climate impacts increasing, and utilities trying to catch up on grid maintenance, it is difficult to predict how many PSPS events volition occur, and how long they might last. Yet, information technology would exist unwise to ignore the information we have that shows outages averaging 2 days, and sometimes exceeding 6 days. If history holds, nosotros can expect that in future outages:

1. Half will final less than 44 hours (ane.8 days)
2. 75% will last less than 62 hours (two.6 days)
3. 90% will last less than 92 hours (3.viii days)
4. 95% will last less than 98 hours (4.1 days)
5. 99% will last less than 120 hours (5 days)

Depending on the impact of outages for various customers, they should programme for outage durations accordingly. Someone who depends on electricity for a life-saving medical device should be prepared to have backup power for that device, or an escape plan to a non-PSPS impacted expanse for at least 5 days. Critical infrastructure dependent on electricity, like water treatment plants, should be similarly prepared.

Customers not so vulnerable to power outages, but obviously inconvenienced by them, should consider the toll of solar, battery, or other distributed generation that helps them movement toward self reliance inside their upkeep, given these expectations.

Figure 9: Cumulative distribution functions of outage durations by year and utility

Location of Events

People and businesses in or well-nigh HFTD Tier 2 and Tier three zones, especially those who take already experienced PSPS shut offs, should be prepared to endure outages that concluding from two days to almost a week and should expect several of these events per yr for the next ten years.

Internet Impact

Utilities will endeavor to grab up on deferred maintenance and arrange to increasing fire danger. Climatic change volition continue to drive farthermost weather that increases fire danger and triggers PSPS events. The end result for the frequency and duration of PSPS outages is still to be seen and hard to predict — other than that PSPS outages will keep to plague California for the foreseeable future.

What to do about PSPS?

Thespian	Recommended Activeness
Policy Makers and Enforcers	Promote distributed generation, in-forepart-of- and backside-the-meter, including microgrids in loftier-take chances areas that enable communities to self generate when transmission and distribution lines are de-energized. Focus on: Medically vulnerable populations whose lives depend on electricity People and communities for whom self-resilience is unaffordable, particularly vulnerable, disadvantaged communities People and communities for whom self-resilience isn't feasible (e.chiliad. renters) Continue to rigorously monitor and enforce reliability, safe, and maintenance standards Collect better information, including geographic information system information to allow mapping of impacted areas, and demographic details especially for vulnerable populations34
Utilities	Catch up on maintenance , especially burn down rubber maintenance Expand undergrounding of power lines Invest in in-front-of-the-meter energy storage and generation enabling more and better community microgrids Better track and support medically vulnerable customers (those who need electricity for life-saving medical devices)
Community Organizations	Build resilience before a disaster—not but fill-in ability, but the social infrastructure and cohesion that helps the customs adapt during stressful situations35 Specifically for outages similar PSPS, work with communities to identify resiliency needs that tin can be supported past admission to resilient energy Work with community and various national, state and local funding agencies to build r esiliency hubs that include 2-6 days of autonomous energy for critical missions
Critical Infrastructure Operators	Invest in backup with resilience — not just solar, only batteries to support critical power needs for up to six days Coordinate with local communities to integrate critical infrastructure microgrids with community microgrids
Individuals and families	Don't have PG&E (or any other utility) as your but power provider Invest in backup with resilience to provide reliable distributed generation for 2-6 days for your critical infrastructure — whether that's your fridge, a dwelling house role, or life-saving medical equipment Solar+battery, if possible Home generator if necessary Fuel for a week — gas stations may not be operational Make sure you can operate it safely36 Equally nearly people tin't afford to invest thousands for a generator or tens of thousands of dollars for solar+batteries for personal energy resilience, other plans are necessary — specially if you or your family members have critical medical or other needs that crave electricity Evacuation plan 37 Emergency power programme 38 Ready to alive without power for 2-half dozen days 39 40 Participate, promote, and vote for community resilience
Researchers	Comport research on where to site distributed energy resources to best support vulnerable and disadvantaged communities in an equitable manner, with participation and input from the communities to be served Deport public health research to better define the impacts of power outages and the relevant exposures and outcomes; consider modifying factors such equally socioeconomics and other vulnerabilities and characteristics of customs resiliency that tin minimize the impacts of power outages41 Behave technical and policy enquiry to lower the cost and increase the accessibility of renewable free energy systems for all, but specially for vulnerable and disadvantaged populations

References

¹ Fox News, "Oxygen-dependent California man dies 12 minutes later on PG&E cuts power to his home," (2019) https://www.foxnews.com/the states/oxygen-dependent-homo-dies-12-minutes-after-pge-cuts-power-to-his-dwelling house

² KQED, " PG&E 'Cheated on Maintenance,' Guess Says — Then Orders New Probation Weather condition," (2020) https://www.kqed.org/news/11815296/pge-cheated-on-maintenance-judge-says-and then-orders-new-probation-conditions

³ US District Court, Northern District of California, Society No. CR xiv-0175 WHA (2020) https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6880045/Alsup-Pge-200429.pdf

^four U.s. District Court, Northern District of California, Guild No. CR 14-0175 WHA (2020) https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6880045/Alsup-Pge-200429.pdf

⁵ Section of Energy, " Final Study on the August 14, 2003 Blackout in the Us and Canada: Causes and Recommendations (2004) https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/BlackoutFinal-Web.pdf

^six Utility Dive, " PG&Eastward 'failed on so many levels' in executing mass ability shutoff, CPUC tells utility execs," (2019) https://world wide web.utilitydive.com/news/pge-failed-on-so-many-levels-in-executing-mass-power-shutoff-cpuc-tells/565405/

^vii California Public Utilities Commission, "Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) / De-Energization," https://world wide web.cpuc.ca.gov/deenergization/

^viii Initiative for Free energy Justice, " California Power Shutoffs: Deficiencies in Information and Reporting," (2020) https://iejusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/V3.three-Policy-Cursory-CA-Shutoffs-Data-Cursory.pdf

⁹ IOUs in CA include PG&E, SDG&E, SCE, PacifiCorp, BVES and Liberty Utilities

¹⁰ California Public Utilities Commission, "ESRB-8," July 12, 2022, https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/publisheddocs/published/g000/m218/k186/218186823.pdf

^eleven customer outage minute = (number of customers in shut-off)*(outage duration in minutes)

¹² JPSS SDOC, JPSS PGRR – Satellite-based Disaster Outreach Coordinator (SDOC), "Kincade Burn down and California power outages on 28 October 2022," (2019), https://www.ssec.wisc.edu/jpss-sdoc/posts/2019-california-wildfiles/kincade-fire-and-california-power-outages-on-28-october-2019/

¹³ CNBC, " PG&E power outage could cost the California economy more $2 billion," (2019) https://world wide web.cnbc.com/2019/10/10/pge-ability-outage-could-cost-the-california-economy-more-than-2-billion.html

¹⁴ 2015 and 2022, merely SDG&E had permission to execute PSPS, and had none to written report.

^fifteen 2015 and 2022, just SDG&East had permission to execute PSPS, and had none to report.

¹⁶ Because 2022 had so many more customers impacted, it dominates the Boilerplate Outage Duration.

¹⁷ San Diego Authorities, "Utilities Undergrounding Program," https://www.sandiego.gov/undergrounding

^xviii San Diego Union Tribune, "SDG&E looking to increase rates 3.iii% from March to December," (2021) https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/concern/story/2021-01-05/sdg-e-looking-to-increase-rates-three-3-from-march-to-december#:~:text=SDG%26E%20has%20cited%20a%20number,ground%2C%20which%20are%20more%20expensive

¹⁹ Energy Information Agency "Annual Electric Ability Industry Report, Class Eia-861 detailed information files," (2019) https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia861/

²⁰ Not unique customers; many experience multiple outages, while others none.

²¹ Not unique customers; many experience multiple outages, while others none.

²² California Public Utilities Commission, "CPUC Fire Safety Rulemaking Background," (2018) https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/firethreatmaps/

²³ California Public Utilities Commission, "CPUC FireMap," https://ia.cpuc.ca.gov/firemap/

²⁴ Utility Dive, PG&Eastward CEO promises 'shorter, fewer' close-offs continuing for the next 5 years," (2019) "https://world wide web.utilitydive.com/news/pge-ceo-shut-offs-shorter-fewer-five-years/569466/

²⁵ Environmental Protection Agency, "California Prepares for Increased Wildfire Risk to Air Quality from Climate Alter," Jan 16, 2022, https://world wide web.epa.gov/arc-x/california-prepares-increased-wildfire-take a chance-air-quality-climate-change

²⁶ NASA Globe Observatory, "Study: Fire seasons getting longer, more frequent," (2015) https://climate.nasa.gov/news/2315/written report-fire-seasons-getting-longer-more-frequent/

²⁷ NOAA National Centers for Ecology information, Climate at a Glance: Statewide Time Series, published Feb 2022, retrieved on March 3, 2022 from https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/cag/

²⁸ Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI) estimates relative soil moisture atmospheric condition. PDSI value >4 represents very wet conditions, while a PDSI <-4 represents an farthermost drought. Encounter https://world wide web.drought.gov/current-conditions

²⁹ California Droughts (2014) https://www.explainxkcd.com/wiki/alphabetize.php/1410:_California

³⁰ RAWS: Knoxville Creek, Atlas Superlative, Hawkeye , and Santa Rosa; NARR: National Centers for Environmental Prediction (NCEP) North American Regional Reanalysis ERA5: fifth-generation of European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF) reanalysis data

³¹ Liu, YC., Di, P., Chen, SH. et al. Climatology of diablo winds in Northern California and their relationships with large-calibration climate variabilities. Clim Dyn 56, 1335–1356 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00382-020-05535-5

³² Liu, YC., Di, P., Chen, SH. et al. Climatology of diablo winds in Northern California and their relationships with large-calibration climate variabilities. Clim Dyn 56, 1335–1356 (2021). https://doi.org/ten.1007/s00382-020-05535-5

³³ Jolly, W., Cochrane, M., Freeborn, P. et al. Climate-induced variations in global wildfire danger from 1979 to 2022. Nat Commun 6, 7537 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1038/ncomms8537

³⁴ Initiative for Energy Justice, "California Power Shutoffs: Deficiencies in Information and Reporting," (2020) https://iejusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/V3.3-Policy-Cursory-CA-Shutoffs-Data-Cursory.pdf

³⁵ Asian Pacific Environmental Network (APEN), "Resilience Before Disaster," (2020) http://apen4ej.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Resilience-Before-Disaster-Written report-Final.pdf

³⁶ Consumer Reports, " Generator Rubber Tips That Will Get You Through a Tempest, and Maybe Relieve Your Life," https://www.consumerreports.org/generators/generator-rubber-tips-to-get-you-through-a-tempest/

³⁷ ready.gov , "Evacuation," https://world wide web.fix.gov/evacuation

³⁸ ADA, "Emergency Power Planning for People Who Use Electricity and Bombardment-Dependent Assistive Technology and Medical Devices," https://adata.org/factsheet/emergency-ability

³⁹ https://prepareforpowerdown.com/

⁴⁰ CPUC Frequently Asked Questions most Utility Public Safety Power Close-off (PSPS) Events: https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PSPSFAQ/

⁴¹ Casey, Joan A., Mihoka Fukurai, Diana Hernández, Satchit Balsari, and Mathew V. Kiang. "Power Outages and Community Health: A Narrative Review." Current Environmental Health Reports 7, no. 4 (December 1, 2022): 371–83. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40572-020-00295-0

⁴² The Guardian, "Explainer: what are the underlying causes of Commonwealth of australia's shocking bushfire flavour?," (2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/globe-commonwealth of australia-50951043

Source: https://www.psehealthyenergy.org/news/blog/preventing-wildfires-with-power-outages-2/

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